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Universalism or Cultural Relativism? 




According to Article 23(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the right of men 
and women of marriageable age to marry and found a family should be recognised. Traditionally, the 
right to marry and found a family is reserved for heterosexual couples only. This view is embodied in 
the 2002 United Nations Communication of Joslin v New Zealand. In 2013, same-sex marriage in New 
Zealand became legal. Nevertheless, Joslin is still being cited elsewhere by anti-same-sex marriage 
campaigners and lawyers globally. 
Even in a country-specific scenario, the legal status of same-sex marriage is far from clear. For example, 
since 2014 same-sex marriage has become legal in England, Wales and Scotland but this does not apply 
to Northern Ireland. Whilst many Western countries campaign for same-sex marriage, many 
postcolonial countries still criminalise private male-to-male consensual sex between adults. Relying on 
the defence of ‘Asian Values’, some particularly argue that ‘gay rights are not human rights’. 
 
There seems to be a general South/North or East/West divide (developing/developed) in the global 
debate on same-sex marriage. Using the 2017 Taiwanese case of Cha-Wei Chi v Taipei, reportedly ‘the 
first same-sex marriage case in Asia’, this paper explores the validity of the above cultural relativist 
argument against universal human rights. 
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Entitled the ‘first-ever United Nations resolution in support of gay rights,’1 the 2011 United 
Nations Resolution 17/19 (aka the South African Resolution) has received vehement 
opposition from 19 countries during its adoption.2 One representative from Asia commented 
that LGBT rights have ‘nothing to do with fundamental human rights.’3 Mahathir, the returned 
incumbent Prime Minister of Malaysia–famous for his ‘Asian Values’ argument, 4  also 
commented recently that: ‘In Malaysia there are some things we cannot accept, even though it 
is seen as human rights in Western countries … We cannot accept LGBT, marriage between 
men and men, women and women.’5 
The universalism versus cultural relativism debate and the so-called ‘Asian Values’ are 
often raised by many Asian governments to defend their lack of human rights engagement in 
terms of the protection of sexual minorities or even to justify their violation of international 
human rights law. Kipling once said: ‘East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall 
meet’.6 In his seminal History of Sexuality, Foucault also observed such East versus West 
attitudes and termed them ars erotica and scientia sexualis. In his view, whilst ars erotica is 
an eastern and ancient view of sex, scientia sexualis is western, modern and scientific. Is the 
‘Asian Values’ claim applicable to all Asian countries? Is there really a cultural gap between 
                                                          
*  Lecturer in Law at University of South Wales. Particular thanks go to the Reviewer and Ruth Gaffney-Rhys 
for their time to review this article. Please note that this paper was written before the 24 November 2018 
Referendum in Taiwan. 
1 D Austin, ‘Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’ (2012) 46 Int’l Law 447. 
2 UNHRC, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/17/19 (14 July 2011), ‘Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity’ in accordance with the ‘Follow-up and implication of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action’. The 19 opposition votes are from Angola, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Djibouti, Gabon, Ghana, Jordan, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Saudi 
Arabia, Senegal and Uganda. Burkina Faso, China and Zambia abstained.  
3 The Guardian, ‘UN Issues First Resolution Condemning Discrimination against Gay People’ (17 June 2011). 
4 S Lukes, Moral Relativism (Profile Books 2008) 99–100. 
5 Reuters, ‘Malaysia Cannot Accept Same-Sex Marriage, Says Mahathir’ (21 September 2018). 
6 R Kipling, ‘The Ballad of East and West’ in T.S. Elliot, Rudyard Kipling’s Verse (Macmillan 1927) 268. 
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the East and West in terms of fundamental human rights? On 24 May 2017, the Grand Justices 
of Judicial Yuan (equivalent to Constitutional Court) in Taiwan, a non-UN member,7 issued 
Interpretation No.748, aka Chia-Wei Chi v Department of Civil Affairs of Taipei City, 
indicating Taiwan’s ambition to become the ‘first country in Asia to legalise same-sex 
marriage’.8 Regardless of the claim, this article intends to examine whether such an East/West 
and relativist/universalist division is still applicable in the digital age when information is 
rapidly transferred, translated, and transformed on a global scale. 
In terms of theoretical basis, initially this research is, and has been, informed by the 
Rawlsian right-based theory of justice and Foucauldian critical analysis, particularly Foucault’s 
engagement with human rights.9 Nevertheless, it has turned to practical documentation of local 
voices following critical analysis of case law. Eventually a vernacular approach has been 
adopted. 
The first section focuses on the relativity/universality debate. It is followed by the 
subsequent hybrid views and their localisation, particularly the 2017 Interpretation No. 748. 
Specific and recent cases, such as QT v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCFA 28 (Hong 
Kong), Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 (Singapore) and Sun Wen Lin v 
Bureau of Civil Affairs of Chang Sha City [2016] Xiang 01 Xing Zhong No. 462 (Mainland 
China), are also introduced to illustrate personal voices. The aim is to initiate a human rights 
culture in Asia via vernacularisation. 
 
The Relativity/Universality Debate 
                                                          
7 VY Weng and Y-M Hsu, ‘Domestication of International Human Rights Norms in Taiwan: A Dialogue 
through Conventionality Review under Construction’ (2017) 1 AYBHRHL 166. 
8 Benjamin Haas, ‘Taiwan’s Top Court Rules in Favour of Same-Sex Marriage’, The Guardian (24 May 2017).  




The relativity/universality debate has been a contentious point since its drafting by the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘UDHR’) committee. In order to reflect its universal 
claim, the committee chair Eleanor Roosevelt (US) was joined by René Cassin (France), 
Charles Malik (Lebanon), Penchun Zhang (China) and John Humphrey (Canada).10 
Responding to the ambitious Declaration, the American Anthropological Association 
(‘AAA’) issued the Statement on Human Rights and cautioned that ‘[t]he history of the 
expansion of the western world has been marked by demoralization of human personality and 
the disintegration of human rights among the peoples over whom hegemony has been 
established.’11 
Influenced by Franz Boas, the father of modern anthropology, the AAA statement 
emphasised the reminiscence of colonialism and imperialism. Consequentially it called for 
respect for diverse cultures of different human groups. Such a cultural relativist’s position 
considers all points of views to be equally valid. Since ethical and political beliefs are related 
to an individual’s cultural identity, ‘the coercive imposition of one culture’s norms on a foreign 
culture is morally illegitimate.’12 
AAA’s self-reflective position on its moral legitimacy is commendable. Moral 
relativism, ‘the idea that the authority of moral norms is relative to time and place,’ is inherently 
controversial and worthy of a separate discussion.13 Nevertheless, respect for diversity does 
not necessarily have to imply moral relativism. The UDHR is a post WWII product and it 
reflects the Cold War division between the Eastern bloc and the Western world in the form of 
                                                          
10 G Hua, ‘From a Human Rights Controversy to Consensus on Human Rights: Zhang Penchun’s Contribution 
to the Universality of Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (2016) 4 China Legal Sci. 30. 
11 American Anthropological Association, ‘Statement On Human Rights’ in HJ Steiner, P Alston and R 
Goodman, (eds.), International Human Rights in Context (3rd ed., OUP 2007)  528. 
12 A Wolman, ‘National Human Rights Commissions and Asian Human Rights Norms’ (2013) 3 AsianJIL 77. 
13 S Lukes, Moral Relativism (Profile Books 2008). 
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the first and second generations of human rights, i.e. civil-political and socio-economic rights, 
whilst the Western world focused more on the first generation and the Eastern bloc focused 
more on the second generation.14 This two-prong approach is a political compromise under the 
banner of universal human rights.15 Citing Mary Ann Glendon’s historical investigation on 
Eleanor Roosevelt and the origin of the UDHR,16 Louis E. Wolcher argues that ‘[t]he idea that 
the same human rights norm might be understood and applied differently by different cultures 
(i.e. in different language-games) was well understood by the framers of the [UDHR]’.17 
Wolman goes further to suggest that the UDHR can be seen as ‘embodying the universalist 
worldview, and in fact universalism values are often seen as the theoretical prerequisite for the 
current local human rights system with international monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms.’18 In sum, universalism, whether moral or cultural, is not only understood by the 
framers, but also ambitiously proclaimed in the title of this international Magna Carta. 
A similar relativist/universalist debate re-emerged during the 1990s with a different 
South/North (developing and developed) twist when some Asian governments (‘South’) were 
confident enough to challenge the traditionally West-centric, capitalist interpretation of 
universal human rights (‘North’).19 As observed by Dianne Otto, the 1990s debate was ‘often 
characterized as a struggle between “Western” and “Asian” values.’20 
                                                          
14 ‘The most basic rights from the 17th and 18th centuries were the rights to free political and economic activity 
and basic liberties; notably, emancipation of the slaves and the birth of democracy. These rights were basic at 
best and further developed in the second generation. The second generation included the protection of economic, 
social and cultural rights and legitimisation of the suffragette movement. They guarantee a certain basic 
standard of living and gave birth to the social welfare state…’ See B Davies, ‘Does it make sense for the law to 
confer rights on the environment?’ (2011) 23(3) ELM 122. 
15 See Preamble of UDHR: ‘Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights 
of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.’ 
16 MA Glendon, A World Made New – Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(Random House 2001). 
17 LE Wolcher, ‘Cultural Diversity and Universal Human Rights’ (2012) 43 Cambrian L. Rev. 44. 
18 Wolman (n.12). 
19 Y Onuma, ‘In Quest of Intercivilizational Human Rights: Universal vs Relative Human Rights Viewed from 
an Asian Perspective’ (2000) 1 Asia-Pac. J. on Hum. Rts. & L. 53. 
20 D Otto, ‘Rethinking the Universality of Human Rights Law’ (1997) 29 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1. 
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Using the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights and the 1995 Beijing 
Fourth World Conference on Women as examples, Otto suggests that ‘the two sides of the 
debate are in agreement over certain fundamental points, despite the appearance of polarization 
and intense disagreement.’21 Reading beyond the texts, she summarises that the debate was in 
fact ‘fueled by competing versions of capitalism rather than by a desire to address issues of 
cultural diversity in human rights discourse.’22 She therefore encapsulates that: 
deployment of the sameness/difference dualities of modernity by both sides of the 
debate furthers the interests of the elites of both camps rather than those of the non-
elite majority … Consequently, neither side of the debate represents a transformative 
commitment to global multiplicity and antidiscipline. Instead, the debate is serving 
a variety of elite macroeconomic interests, and will continue to do so while 
articulated in modernity’s dualistic terms.23 
In order to provide constructive solutions, Otto proposes five strategies: 
(1) Rejecting the universalising knowledge claims of modernity; 
(2) Refusing the hierarchy of the generational development of human rights and insisting on 
their indivisibility; 
(3) Replacing the myopic silencing of the language of dualistic alternatives with the 
consciousness of multiplicities and incommensurabilities; 
(4) Decentering the nation-state in the global community; and 
(5) Recognising the limits of law as a means of transformative change.24 
 
Otto’s critique of the misappropriated relativist-universalist debate is echoed by 
Yasuaki Onuma’s deconstruction of universality. In his 2000 article, Onuma explores the 
fundamental question: are human rights universal?25 Reflecting on Japan’s imperialism and 
war crimes during WWII, he suggests seven steps from an equally Asian yet human rights 
compliant perspective. First, it should be recognised that human rights are only one of many 
ways to pursue the spiritual as well as material well-being of humanity. Although being one of 
many tools, the human rights mechanism is the most effective one as long as the modern system 
                                                          
21 Otto (n 20) 6. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Otto (n 20) 7. 
24 Otto (n 20) 37. 
25 Onuma (n 19). 
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of sovereign nation-states still exists. Thirdly, in order to guarantee civil-political rights, a 
preceding or at least concurrent progress in socio-economic rights is necessary. After all, ‘[t]he 
very history of human rights in Western nations and in Japan demonstrates that the protection 
of civil and political rights can only go hand in hand with economic, social, and educational 
progress.’26 
Historically speaking, like the governments of developed countries (‘North’) during 
their development and modernisation, the governments of developing countries (‘South’) are 
equally committing and will continue to commit human rights violations. Global monitoring 
of and encouragement to respect human rights are crucial. The contemporary human rights 
discourse is unarguably West-centric and foreign to many developing countries. It is natural 
that many of them are critical of such ‘human rights diplomacy’. It is therefore important for 
the North to be equally critical of their own past and to appreciate non-Western and non-
Christian cultures in order to conduct a meaningful dialogue. Finally, the human rights 
mechanism, far from perfect, is a living instrument. It has an aspirational nature and can be 
improved through constant reconceptualisation. 
 
 As the old legal proverb goes: ‘before one starts to point fingers, make sure one’s 
hands are clean’. Onuma’s reflections coincide with the theoretical basis of the 2001 UNESCO 
Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. Article 4 states that ‘[n]o one may invoke cultural 
diversity to infringe upon human rights guaranteed by international law, nor to limit their scope.’ 
Despite such effort to establish universality on top of relativity, the dialectic South/North divide 
between individuals and their culture remains to affect international human rights discourse.27 
                                                          
26 Onuma (n 19) 58. 
27 Wolcher (n 17). 
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In addition to lawyers, some of today’s prominent anthropologists have also started to 
question the extreme form of cultural relativism. Jane K. Cowan, Marie-Benedicte Dembour 
and Richard A. Wilson contend that the relativist/universalist debate ‘has reached an 
impasse’.28 Elvin Hatch also proposes that, ‘[i]nstead of leaving culture as they are, as museum 
pieces, we should help to bring about change – or, better, we should help the oppressed to bring 
about change.’29 Sixty years after the AAA Statement, historian Reza Afshari asserts: ‘[a]lmost 
all discussions that once populated the relativist niche have receded into background. The field 
is now crowded in the middle. Those who really deserve attention place their marker close to 
the universalist side.’30  
This middle ground view is that cultural relativism and universalism cannot be 
considered independently.31 Anthropologist/lawyer Sally Engle Merry succinctly puts it: 
rather than seeing universalism and cultural relativism as alternatives which one 
must choose, once and for all, one should see the tension between the positions as 
part of the continuous process of negotiating ever-changing and interrelated global 
and local norms.32  
One representative narrative in this middle ground is Jack Donnelly’s ‘Relative 
Universality,’ 33  a form of universalism that ‘also allows substantial space for important 
(second-order) claims of relativism.’34 This hybrid approach reflects the rejection of the over-
simplistic binary view of relativism versus universalism. On the other side of this hybrid 
approach is Michael Goodhart’s position of ‘Neither Relative Nor Universal.’35  Goodhart 
                                                          
28 JK Cowan, M.-B. Dembour and RA Wilson (eds.), Culture and Rights – Anthropological Perspectives, 
(Cambridge University Press 2001) 5. 
29 E Hatch, ‘Culture and Morality: The Relativity of Values in Anthropology’ in Steiner, Alston and Goodman 
(n 11) 521. 
30 R Afshari, ‘Relativity in Universality: Jack Donnelly’s Grand Theory in Need of Specific Illustrations’ (2015) 
37 Hum. Rts. Q. 854. 
31 M-B Dembour, ‘Following the Movement of a Pendulum: Between Universalism and Relativism’ in JK 
Cowan, M-B Dembour and RA Wilson (eds.), Culture and Rights–Anthropological Perspectives (Cambridge 
University Press 2001) 56. 
32 S Merry, ‘Human Rights and Gender Violence’ in Steiner, Alston and Goodman (n 11) 525. 
33 J Donnelly, ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’ (2007) 28 Hum. Rts. Q. 281.  
34 J Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (3rd ed., Cornell Press 2013) 93. 
35 M. Goodhart, ‘Neither Relative nor Universal: A Response to Donnelly’ (2008) 30 Hum. Rts. Q. 183. 
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expresses his frustration on the wasted energy that scholars ‘have worried too much that human 
rights might be relative and stained too hard to prove them universal.’36 He suggests to leave 
this divisive rhetoric behind and instead emphasise their ‘global appeal’ which can improve 
the precision of legal analysis, make the legitimacy bases clearer and avoid misuse while 
simultaneously utilising ‘the impetus for an ongoing reformulation of rights that adds to their 
inclusiveness and generality.’37 Such deliberate distance from the relativist/universalist debate 
is shared by Vitit Muntarbhorn, the first UN Independent Expert on violence and discrimination 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity of the Human Rights Council, who suggests a 
humanist approach instead of a relative/universal one.38 
The Arab Spring added a new lease of life to the old debate. Not entirely convinced by 
the pure academic discussion and ‘grand theory,’ Afshari cautions that ‘hypothetical examples 
without references to specific human rights reports cannot be practically useful for monitoring 
and advocacy.’39 
Any defense of any conceivable position on the universalism-relativism spectrum can 
become persuasive only if the theoretical explorations are tightly interlaced with the 
critical assessments of the actual human rights violations that national and 
transnational human rights monitors have documented and analysed.40 
 
Instead of grand theory, he recommends scholars to document the occurring violations 
and listen to the voices of victims of human rights violations. Using the example of Egypt 
during Arab Spring, he further suggests: 
Writing about affected lives, capturing their voices and, thus, giving substance to 
documentations – now in full display in the cyberspaces – ought to provide the backbone 
for any theory that our scholars construct. Those among the youth who click on a 
staggering number of websites, cataloguing and analyzing human rights violations, in so 
                                                          
36 Goodhart (n 35) 193. 
37 Ibid.  
38 V Muntarbhorn, ‘Asia and Human Rights at the Crossroads of the New Millennium: Between the Universalist 
and the Particularist?’ in Robert G. Patman (ed.), Universal Human Rights? (Macmillan Press 2000) 81–92.  
39 Afshari (n 30) 854. 
40 Afshari (n 30) 856. 
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many languages, are hardly attracted to the allure of theoretical foundations of human 
rights. In recent decades, their life experiences have set up a learning curve pointing 
toward the UDHR model as the most pertinent antidote to abuses… The collection is our 
hard drive – with international rubrics for registering these voices – that should remain 
immune to cultural relativist clatters, mild or raucous.41 
 
There is an evolutive agenda in the human rights project: ‘a traditional culture must 
change for the culture of human rights to emerge.’42 Based on this pragmatic approach, the 
following case study documents such voices in Taiwan, a non-UN member and a Chinese-
speaking jurisdiction under the ‘soft, Confucian authoritarianism’ in the digital age.43 
 
A Vernacular Approach 
 
In the West, the claim is generally valid that gender and sexuality diversity is a question of 
humanity.44 Likewise, gay rights are universal human rights in most developing countries.45 If 
the above claims are valid in the West, then sexual minorities elsewhere should equally enjoy 
the same universal human rights in theory. However, this hypothesis is far from reality, at least 
at present. The explanation to this conundrum is perhaps historical.  
As noted by Onuma, it is irrefutable that the post-WWII modern human rights are 
historically Western and dominated by the North. 46  Through the civil rights movement, 
women’s movement and gay rights movement, the expression of gay identity and sexual 
identities has been gradually incorporated into the sexually neutral language of rights in the 
                                                          
41 Afshari (n 30) 912. 
42 Afshari (n 30) 879. 
43 Y. Ghai, ‘Human Rights and Governance: The Asia Debate’ (2000) 1 Asia-Pac. J. on Hum. Rts. & L. 9. 
44 D. Otto, ‘Gender and Sexual Diversity: A Question of Humanity’, (2016) 17 Melb. J. Int’l L. 477. 
45 Austin (n 1). 
46 Onuma (n 19). 
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West.47 In order to transfer the universal value to the rest of the world, the relatively pragmatic 
Southern narratives deserve equal, if not more, attention on a global scale.48 
Equivalently noteworthy are the non-legal perspectives. Merry indicates that the days 
of ‘culture’ being seen as residual cause or as holistic system have long gone.49 
Instead of seeing culture as referring to the integrated and relatively harmonious ideas 
and practices of a particular group, anthropologists increasingly see it as a repertoire of 
actions, practices and beliefs that are relatively flexible and open to change. … Culture 
provides the lens through which new institutions and practices are adopted and 
transformed.50 
 
This is what she called ‘vernacularisation’ of universal human rights.51 As noted by 
Wolman, similar concepts of human rights localisation are also shared by others such as Amitav 
Acharya,52 who defines the displacement of a local cultural norm with foreign human rights 
norm as ‘the active construction [of new norms] through discourse, framing, grafting, and 
cultural selection of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing 
significant congruence with local beliefs and practices.’53 
It is undeniable that these local ‘translators’ of universal human rights lexicons, 
including political leaders, activists, academics, domestic courts, NGOs, and national/regional 
human rights organisations, are the key actors during such a vernacularisation process.  
Through the lens of human rights vernacularisation, the voices of these ‘translators’ from actual 
                                                          
47 Davies (n 14). 
48 Afshari (n 30).  
49 According to Geertz culture means ‘a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means 
of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.’ See 
Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (Basic Books 1973); Afshari (n 30).  
50 SE Merry, ‘What Is Legal Culture – An Anthropological Perspective’ (2010) 5 J. Comp. L. 40. 
51 SE Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness Among Working-Class Americans, 
(University of Chicago Press 1990); SE Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International 
Law into Local Justice (University of Chicago Press 2006). Also see Thomas Boellstorff, ‘Dubbing Culture: 
Indonesian Gay and Lesbian Subjectivities and Ethnography in an Already Globalized World’ (2003) 30 
American Ethnologist 225. 
52 Wolman (n 12). 
53 A Acharya, ‘How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian 
Regionalism’ (2004) 58 International Organization 239. 
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real life human rights violations are documented in Brazil,54 Latin America,55 Sierra Leone,56 
South Africa, 57  India, 58  Pakistan, 59  Cambodia, 60  Indonesia, 61  Timor-Leste, 62  and even 
developed countries such as Norway,63 Japan and Korea.64 Inevitably these ‘users’ of human 
rights are mostly academics. 65 Nevertheless, there are also perspectives from NGOs working 
in the developing fields.66 Through such process of vernacularisation, ‘human rights language 
has been … transcending these circumstances since its worldwide appropriation,’67 particularly 
in the digital age. 
The above relativity (or diversity)/universality tension also exists between universal 
human rights and ‘legal pluralism.’ 68  Although legal pluralism and cultural relativity (or 
diversity) are two separate concepts, they share a similar respect of local differences. On the 
one hand, the universal human rights provide the minimum guarantee of human dignity of all 
human beings and there should be no compromise. The UDHR is an aspirational project and it 
                                                          
54 C Fonseca, ‘Inequality Near and Far: Adoption as Seen from the Brazilian Favelas’ (2002) 36 Law & Soc’y 
Rev. 397. 
55 K Sikkink, ‘Latin America’s Protagonist Role in Human Rights’ (2015) 22 SUR – Int’l J. on Hum Rts. 207. 
56 ASJ Park, ‘Consolidating Peace: Rule of Law Institutions and Local Justice Practices in Sierra Leone’ (2008) 
24 S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts. 536. 
57 C Himonga and F Diallo, ‘Decolonisation and Teaching Law in Africa with Special Reference to Living 
Customary Law’ (2017) 20 Potchefstroom Elec. L. J. 1. 
58 S Grinsell, ‘Caste and the Problem of Social Reform in Indian Equality Law’ (2010) 35 Yale J. Int’l L. 199. 
59 MS Hussain, ‘History, Law and Vernacular Knowledge: The Threat to Women’s Collective Representation 
under the Guise of Androgyny in Pakistan’ (2016) 7 King’s Student L. Rev. 64. 
60 H Charlesworth, ‘Swimming to Cambodia Justice and Ritual in Human Rights after Conflict’ (2010) 29 Aust. 
YBIL 1. 
61 N Johnstone, ‘Indonesia in the REDD: Climate Change, Indigenous Peoples and Global Legal Pluralism’ 
(2010) 12 APLPJ 93. Also see A Bedner and S van Huis, ‘Plurality of Marriage Law and Marriage Registration 
for Muslims in Indonesia: A Plea for Pragmatism’ (2010) 6 Utrecht L. Rev. 175. 
62 J Yogaratnam, ‘A Review of the 2010 Domestic Violence Law in Timor-Leste’ (2013) 8 AsJCL 1. 
63 A Dilwyn Fisher, ‘Legal Pluralism and Human Rights in the Idea of Climate Justice’ (2015) 2 Oslo L. Rev. 
200. 
64 JW Shin, ‘Coming out of the Closet: A Comparative Analysis of Marriage Equality between the East and 
West’ (2017) 49 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1119. 
65 M Baumgartel, ‘Perspective on the User: Unpacking a Concept for Human Rights Research’ (2014) 8 Hum. 
Rts. & Int’l Legal Discourse 142. 
66 G Chillier and PB Timo, ‘The Global Human Rights Movement in the 21st Century: Reflections from the 
Perspective of a National Human Rights NGO from the South’ (2014) 20 SUR – Int’l J. on Hum Rts. 375. 
67 R Baldissone, ‘A Contribution to a Western Genealogy of the Rights of Men and Incidentally, of Women’ 
(2011) 34 Austl. Feminist L.J. 89. 
68 F von Benda-Beckmann and K von Benda-Beckmann, ‘The Dynamics of Change and Continuity in Plural 
Legal Orders’ (2006) 53 J. Legal Pluralism & Unofficial L. 1. 
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contains a blatantly humanist agenda. On the other hand, any legal reforms that ‘fail to 
recognise and support the processes of social cohesion and mutual support that characterise 
vernacular systems are likely to have serious unintended consequences especially insofar as 
they distort power relations.’69 David M. Engel provides his observation in Northern Thailand 
where local women have been left in the lacuna between ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity.’70 Such is 
the problem of placing universality and cultural relativity at the two ends of a spectrum without 
acknowledging the possibility of their coexistence. Like gender, this binary view creates a 
troubled gap in the middle. 
To illustrate the process of vernacularisation of universal human rights in terms of 
sexual minorities, the discussion turns to Taiwan, one of several East Asian jurisdictions which 
is presumably affected by the ‘soft, authoritarian Confucianism.’ 71  The outcome of this 
vernacular exercise is embodied in the 2017 Grand Justices Interpretation No. 748 regarding 
the legalisation of same-sex marriage in Taiwan from the Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan.72 
Interpretation No.748, aka Chia-Wei Chi v Department of Civil Affairs of Taipei City,  
indicates Taiwan’s ambition to become the ‘first country in Asia to legalise same-sex marriage’. 
The Grand Justices first clarified that traditionally ‘the provisions of Chapter 2 on Marriage of 
Part IV on Family of the Taiwan Civil Code do not allow two persons of the same sex to create 
a permanent union of intimate and exclusive nature for the purpose of living a common life.’ 
After heightened scrutiny from legal, cultural, societal and medical discourses, the majority of 
the Grand Justices decided that such provisions ‘are in violation of constitution’s guarantees of 
                                                          
69 SM Weeks and A Claassens, ‘Tensions between Vernacular Values that Prioritise Basic Needs and State 
Versions of Customary Law that Contradict Them – We Love These Fields that Feed Us, But Not at the 
Expense of a Person’ (2011) 22 Stellenbosch L. Rev. 823. 
70 DM Engel, ‘The Uses of Legal Culture in Contemporary Socio-Legal Studies: A Response to Sally Engle 
Merry’ (2010) 5 J. Comp. L. 59.  
71 Ghai (n 43) 10.  
72 Grand Justices Interpretation No. 748. Equivalent to a constitutional court judgment< 
https://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=748 > accessed 2 July 2018. 
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both the people’s freedom of marriage under Article 22 and the people’s right to equality under 
Article 7.’73 
 This decision did not come without complication. Taiwan withdrew from UN before 
China’s accession in 1971. Its Constitution, being drafted around the same time as UDHR and 
ICCPR, understandably lacks specific protection of sexual orientation and gender identity. 
Despite its sui generis status, Taiwan voluntarily adopted a simulation system of international 
human rights treaty monitoring exercise in 2009 and published its first national report in 2012.74 
Vivianne Yen-ching Weng and Yao-ming Hsu are in the view that the ‘[i]ntegration of 
international human rights norms into its domestic legal system does not necessarily require a 
contracting party status at the international level.’75 Commenting on Taiwan’s self-established, 
on-site, UN-type treaty review and focusing particularly on the abolishment of death penalty 
and legalisation of same-sex marriage, Yu-Jie Chen also comments that: ‘[the simulation 
monitoring] is an example of local actors claiming ownership over a human rights project while 
making the most of global norms, expertise and other resources despite exclusion from the UN 
regime.’76 
Whether or not the Taiwanese same-sex marriage legalisation is initially a move of 
‘human rights diplomacy’ orchestrated by the government to increase its international profile, 
the local ‘users’ such as academics, activists, and NGOs, took over the ‘local-global co-
ownership of international human rights project’ to vernacularise the international human rights 
norms on sexual minorities in Taiwan.77 
                                                          
73 Article 22, Constitution: ‘All other freedoms and rights of the people that are not detrimental to social order or 
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For example, Interpretation No. 748 specifically recognises Chia-Wei Chi’s 30-year 
activism for he ‘has been appealing to the legislative, executive, and judicial departments for 
the right to same-sex marriage.’78 Despite the lack of legal recognition, individual attempts to 
conduct nominal same-sex weddings never cease to exist.79 In addition to individual effort, 
institutional initiatives of legalising same-sex marriage go far back as 2005/2006 although with 
little success until the establishment of Taiwan Alliance to Promote Civil Partnership Rights 
(TAPCPR) in 2009. TAPCPR is the first organisation dedicated to marriage equality in 
Taiwan.80  Sensitive to the feminist critique that same-sex marriage could have become a 
heteronormative Gold Standard and potentially marginalised other models of living so as to 
‘limit the ability to imagine alternative forms of living,’81 the founders of TAPCPR, being self-
identified queer feminists, intend to bridge the two communities of women and LGBT.82 
The timing for legalising same-sex marriage in Taiwan through the judicial branch finally 
arrived in 2016/17. The 2017 Interpretation No. 748 was published after the second simulation 
human rights treaty review. 83  The government was given two years of grace period to 
implement relevant laws and regulations in accordance with the Interpretation. Should the 
government fail to amend or enact such laws by 24th May 2019, registration of same-sex unions 
shall become automatic. 
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This vernacular experience in Taiwan has demonstrated how local sexual minorities 
and civil society adopt cultural, social, political and legal identities on a global scale through 
connecting their own local experiences to the universal struggle. Through such transferable 
experience, they acquire different ways of understanding themselves, layering new identities 
on to their existing ones.84  The ‘global’ element in this local vernacular exercise requires some 
reading between the lines. For example, in terms of the lack of specific protection of sexual 
orientation and gender identity in the original Article 7 of the Constitution, the Grand Justices 
followed the practice in the 1994 UN Human Rights Committee case Toonen v Australia and 
read ‘sexual orientation’ into ‘sex.’85 Although the borrowing of equality and due process 
arguments from foreign cases was less apparent in the text of the Interpretation, the Grand 
Justices specifically cited Obergefell v Hodges and the declassification of homosexuality as a 
mental disease in the 1990 World Health Organisation (WHO) International Classification of 
Diseases and Related Health Problems in the footnotes to reinforce the medical discourse 
utilised to justify their decision.86 Local lawyers who are familiar with Rawls can also identify 
the link between the equality argument and the concept of fairness as justice in a constitutional 
democratic society.87 Such a ‘bottom up’ civil movement undoubtedly employs ‘the right-
based litigation as a strategy of social movement’.88  
Regarding the usual suspect of Confucianism influence,89 there was no such trace in the 
majority opinion. Instead, it appeared in the Dissenting Opinion by Grand Justice Chen-Huan 
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Wu.90 Using a strictly textual interpretation of Joslin v New Zealand,91 Wu considered the 
wording of ‘men and women’ in UDHR Art. 16 and ICCPR Art. 23(2) to be limited to one man 
and one woman only. Commenting on the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) 
jurisprudence such as Schalk and Kopf v Austria,92 he also upheld the constitutionality of the 
current heteronormative marriage between one man and one woman exclusively. Relying on 
the figures of UN members legalising same-sex marriage (21 out of 193, roughly 10 per cent), 
he also proclaimed that ‘same-sex marriage is not universal human rights (同性婚姻不是普世
保障之人權).’93 In terms of reproduction, he ignored the majority opinion and justified the 
differential treatment between different-sex couples and same-sex couples. In his view, courts 
were not the appropriate fora to change the historical institution of marriage. Citing a series of 
post-Schalk ECtHR cases,94 he emphasised the importance of the ‘deep-rooted social and 
cultural connotations which may differ largely from one society to another.’95 Using a narrative 
akin to the margin of appreciation principle,96 he proposed to solve this issue with a referendum. 
The Chinese proverb that ‘even the wisest judge cannot adjudicate family disputes’ is 
perfect to summarise the situation and yet at the same time poignant.97 One of the aims of 
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human rights law is to counter-balance the possible problems created by popular votes against 
minorities in any given democracy. Notwithstanding Justice’s Wu’s dissent, human rights is 
not and should not be a numbers game. The mechanism of constitutional or judicial review 
directly addresses the potential majoritarian vice. Furthermore, the dissent’s intentional 
disregard of Joslin’s critique of not being ‘good law’ reflects the complication of this ongoing 
debate at a global level. 98 Whilst Grand Justice Wu selectively focuses on a few outdated 
ECtHR cases, he also fails, either intentionally or unintentionally, to mention the development 
in the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). This lack of engagement with the most recent 
jurisprudence from both ECtHR and CJEU is particularly confusing when both European 
courts have recently released some forward-thinking decisions which will be discussed in the 
next section.99 
In April 2018, Taiwan’s Central Election Commission accepted two anti-same-sex-
marriage proposals for referendum. If around 280,000 signatures (equate to 1.5 percent of the 
eligible voters) are collected, the referendum will be held in Taiwan. By then, hopefully the 
situation will be clearer to see whether human rights progress is really ‘two steps forward, one 
step back’.100 
In terms of referendum, perhaps something can be learned from Ireland. On 22 May 
2015, Ireland became the first country to approve same-sex marriage by popular vote, followed 
by the 34th Amendment of the Constitution.101 Against the strong religious background, the 
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Irish marriage equality movement also started with an individual lawsuit.102 As most human 
rights lawyers could possibly profess, behind each individual case there is a personal story.103 
If history is indicative, the proposed referendum in Taiwan to overturn Interpretation No.748 
may be an opportunity for the sexual minorities and civil society to once again engage with the 
wider general public and to consolidate the learned human rights lessons. This challenge may 
trigger the whole society to rethink marriage, family, adoption, education, religion, culture, and 
most importantly, equality and human dignity. 
 
The Next Stop? 
 
One question deserves further investigation during the discussion of relativity/universality: 
should economic progress be built on the disenfranchisement of civil political rights?104 
The 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action states that ‘all human rights are 
universal, indivisible, and interdependent and interrelated’. The legal recognition of same-sex 
relationship is no exception: it has civil-political elements as well as socio-economic ones. This 
can be observed in the following cases in other Chinese-speaking jurisdictions of Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Mainland China. 
Despite the increasing influence from Mainland China, Hong Kong courts in general 
‘have been the primary driver of LGBT rights.’105 Following the Common Law tradition, 
‘Hong Kong lawyers and judges are adept at applying international norms when assessing the 
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constitutionality of Hong Kong statutes and government actions that discriminate on the ground 
of sexual orientation.’106 These claims are once again proven valid by a recent case that made 
international headline concerning resident permit, a socio-economic yet simultaneously civil-
political issue, as well as private international law. 
On 4th July 2018, after four years of high-profiled legal proceeding, a British national 
QT was finally granted the right to reside in Hong Kong as a spousal dependant of her same-
sex partner SS who was both South African and British.107 QT and SS entered into a civil 
partnership in England in 2011.108 Soon afterwards, SS obtained employment in Hong Kong 
with an employment visa. QT entered Hong Kong with SS as a visitor. In 2014, QT submitted 
her application for a dependant visa and it was rejected by the Director of Immigration because 
QT’s relationship with SS was ‘outside the existing policy’ which admitted a spouse as a 
dependant only if he or she was a party to a monogamous marriage consisting of one male and 
one female. QT’s discrimination claim based on sexual orientation was dismissed by the HK 
Court of First Instance. After her appeal, the HK Court of Appeal unanimously allowed QT’s 
appeal and considered the discrimination claim valid.109 Subsequently the Director filed an 
appeal to the HK Final Court of Appeal but it was rejected. Eventually, the HK Court of Appeal 
decision stayed. 
From a comparative point-of-view, QT is equivalent to the ECtHR decision of 
Taddeucci and McCall v Italy.110  The CJEU took a similar view in Coman & Hamilton v 
Romania where legally married same-sex couples have the same residency rights as 
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heterosexual spouses under the EU freedom of movement principle even if the same-sex 
marriage is not legally recognised in the country they move to.111  
In addition to international compliance, the significance of QT is not only socio-
economic but also civil-political. In terms of socio-economic right, the business case of equality 
is made clear. QT received the support from 15 banks, 16 law firms and Amnesty 
International.112 They publicly backed QT and argued diverse hiring practices was required in 
order to attract top talent and this was acknowledged by the court.113 In terms of civil-political 
right, Hong Kong’s judiciary system once again proved that the minimum protection of 
fundamental rights was maintained after Mainland China’s takeover in 1997.  
With cautious optimism, the QT effect remains to be observed. A month before the 
success of QT, another case received a defeat in HK Court of Appeal  –  Leung Chun Kwong.114 
Leung, a civil servant, applied for spousal benefits for his British partner and his application 
was rejected because their lawful marriage in New Zealand was not recognised in Hong Kong. 
Consequentially, his legally wedded partner was not considered as his ‘spouse.’115  As of 
writing, Leung is still pending in the HK Final Court of Appeal. 
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Residency and spousal benefits are fundamental socio-economic issues for any couple, 
same-sex or not. In the ECtHR, similar cases such as P.B & J.S concerning social security has 
been examined.116 In the CJEU, there was also Maruko concerning pension rights for the 
surviving spouse. 117 In the U.S., Windsor can also provide some reference in terms of tax.118 
As suggested by Onuma previously, these preceding or concurrent socio-economic cases 
provided the basis for civil-political rights advancement. 
The shared colonial past and common law system of Hong Kong and Singapore provide 
an opportunity for comparative study.119 Originally the ‘Asian values’ debate can be traced 
back to the 1993 Word Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. 120  The governments of 
Singapore, China and Malaysia argued that the denial of political liberty and basic civil rights 
helped to stimulate economic growth.121 Whilst other governments, such as India, Japan and 
South Korea, insisted that it was neither justifiable nor appropriate to deny some human rights 
in order to guarantee others.122 This ‘elitist’ governmental debate explains the background of 
Otto’s comment regarding universalism/relativism and Onuma’s alternative Asian perspective 
of human rights. 
The ‘Asian values’ debate can be further illustrated by the Singaporean anti-sodomy 
law, Penal Code Section 377A which criminalises private and consensual male-to-male sex. 
Homosexual criminalisation such as §377A in Singapore, Malaysia and India is a colonial 
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legacy.123 Back home in the UK and Europe, homosexual criminalisation has become a non-
issue since Dudgeon.124 At UN level, the decriminalisation in Toonen also sets the international 
benchmark.125 Nevertheless, the Anglican legacy of homosexual criminalisation still lingers in 
the Commonwealth.126 Under the Singaporean ‘Lee thesis’ style post-colonial paternalism or 
‘Authoritarian Capitalism,’ §377A continues to regulate the sex and love of post-colonial 
gays.127 Cases such as Lim Meng Suang make Singaporean gays ‘unarrested criminals.’128 
Using examples of postwar Japan and Germany, South Korean and Taiwan in the 1970’s, and 
the more recent Brazil and India, economist Amartya Sen suggests that the post-colonial, 
paternalistic and capitalist method adopted by Singapore is not the only formula for economic 
development. Like Onuma, Sen also deems that there is no justification to sacrifice human 
rights in order to gain success. He even proclaims: ‘developing and strengthening a democratic 
system is an essential component of the process of development’ sustainably.129 Both Sen and 
Onuma’s observations bring the discussion of development versus human rights to China, a 
growing economic superpower with space for human rights improvement. 
Afshari observes that ‘the Chinese are enthusiastically embracing anything Western but 
are not ready to adopt Western-style democracy.’130 ‘Ready’ is the keyword here. After being 
internationally criticised following the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, the Chinese 
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government has discovered ‘human rights diplomacy’ as a counter-discourse against its critique. 
Since 1991, it has been publishing its own whitepapers, Human Rights in China. In response 
to the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices issued by the U.S. State Department, the 
Beijing government also published a report on the U.S. violation of human rights in 2017.131 
Nevertheless, no policy regarding protection of sexual minorities is mentioned in the white 
papers or China’s 2013 Universal Periodic Review report to the UN Human Rights Council.132 
Although homosexuality was decriminalised in 1997 and removed from the official list 
of mental disorder in 2001, most sexual minorities refrain from publicly discussing their sexual 
orientation or gender identity in China.133  The government claims that antidiscrimination 
measures to protect sexual minorities are ‘implemented’ but this is challenged by several 
NGOs.134 One issue being discussed often by the media is marriage fraud amongst the lesbian 
and gay community due to societal discrimination and pressure to conform to family 
expectations.135 A more recent issue is conversion therapy.136 
In terms of academic discussion, monographs and journal articles published in 
Mandarin Chinese are available but not easily accessible due to the language barrier.137 Online 
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discussion is also observed in Chinese social media but cyberspace freedom in China is a 
general concern.138   The most notable work can be attributed to Li Yinhe, a sociologist, 
sexologist and LGBT+ activist.139 Since 2003, Li has repeatedly attempted to bring the issue 
of same-sex marriage before both of China’s representative bodies (the National People’s 
Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress). Under the unofficial 
‘don’t ask don’t tell’ policy, there has been no significant progress. 
Perhaps the government’s reluctance to actively engage with the same-sex marriage 
debate can be found in judicial decisions. The Sun Wen Lin case provides such an example.140 
In 2015, Sun and his partner Hu applied for marriage registration in Changsha City, Hunan 
Province. It was rejected by the local government and the couple filed an appeal. Confirming 
that marriage in China required a man and a woman, their appeal was denied by the court of 
second instance. Despite the legal failure and lack of legal recognition, reportedly Sun and Hu 
conducted a ceremony on 17 May 2016. According to them, this was only the first wedding of 
a hundred and they had also proposed their own version of civil code amendment to include 
same-sex marriage.141 
Encouraged by Taiwan’s Interpretation No.748, Li comments:  
I think the meaning of this move is tremendous. In the past, the same-sex marriage 
narrative has been relying on those twenty or so Western European and Norther 
American countries which have legalised same-sex marriage. People say the Western 
sex culture is not like ours. Their social custom is not like ours. These are all excuses. 
If Taiwan can legalises same-sex marriage, then it proves that same-sex marriage can 
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be accepted by Chinese culture and in Chinese societies. I think this is a particularly 
great encouragement for Chinese tongzhi. It means that if Taiwan can, so can we.142 
 
Such narrative that ‘if Taiwan can, so can we’ should not be underestimated. It is the 
proof of effective human rights acculturation which provides an alternative to the traditional 
methods of coercion and persuasion from the outside, e.g., naming and shaming. 143 
Acculturation requires self-reflection, self-initiation and self-determination. The problem is, 
acculturation is a process of change and change takes time. ‘Justice delayed is justice denied.’ 
How many stories like the death of Jacques Picoux do the civil society still have to witness?144 





The ‘clean hand’ principle dictates that we must reflect on our own situation before we point 
fingers at others. In the UK, although equal marriage/civil partnership is now applicable in 
England, Wales and Scotland particularly after the 2018 UK Supreme Court decision to allow 
different-sex couples to enter civil partnership, marriage is still an aspiration for same-sex 
couples in Northern Ireland.145 Within Europe, legislations in terms of equal marriage also 
require harmonisation. Globally, although equal marriage has been accepted in many UN 
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member states following a teleological interpretation of ICCPR Article 23(2), Joslin remains 
to be the existing UN authority regarding the application of Article 23(2) to same-sex couples. 
Before its repeal, bad law is still law. 
As we have seen, the relativity/universality binary division is often used by 
governments to justify elitist interests. Nevertheless, governments cannot be equated with civil 
societies. Amongst fevered political languages and fake news, the ‘hard drive activism’ forms 
a reverse discourse against grand theories and propaganda. The civil society in Taiwan has 
proven that even if their government is not part of the official UN mechanism, its people, 
particularly the vulnerable minorities, still form part of the international citizenship. The ‘if 
Taiwan can, so can we’ narrative is useful to vernacularise the universal human rights culture 
in other societies such as China. The personal struggles in Hong Kong and Singapore also 
indicate the pragmatic side of this battle: both civil-political rights and socio-economic rights 
are equally important during this process of acculturation.  ‘People’s suffering must never be 
allowed to remain the silent residue of politics.’ 146  Eventually it is the duty of every 
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